2/11/2011 (Last revised, 3/17/2011)
Short essays toward "Two ways of identification"
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2/11/2011 (Revised, 2/24)
I'm again changing my plan. Earlier, I changed my original plan to upload a paper I had written years ago, "On Formalism," as the first paper for this website. Instead, I uploaded another paper, "Argument from relatives," as an introduction to one of the most important pillars of the kind of re-thinking of "mind" to be expressed in this website. The "pillar" is what I now call two ways of identification, appearing in the title of this section of this website. I was thinking that I had presented an outline of this "pillar" in "On formalism." But, when I read it again this time, I realized that what was mainly given there was a related but different idea, which I now would call two kinds of syntactic identity in distinction from two ways of identification. In fact, these two ideas were still undifferentiated in "On Formalism," which I think is more of a hindrance than a contribution to the communication of my re-thinking of "mind." I admit that "On Formalism" is a work of a still extremely premature thinker.
I decided to revise this paper. I'm working on it now.
In the meantime, I will write directly on the two ways of identification here, in a series of short informal essays. I will upload this series of essays in one Word file (compatible mode), and will replace it as I add more essays to it.
I'm again changing my plan. Earlier, I changed my original plan to upload a paper I had written years ago, "On Formalism," as the first paper for this website. Instead, I uploaded another paper, "Argument from relatives," as an introduction to one of the most important pillars of the kind of re-thinking of "mind" to be expressed in this website. The "pillar" is what I now call two ways of identification, appearing in the title of this section of this website. I was thinking that I had presented an outline of this "pillar" in "On formalism." But, when I read it again this time, I realized that what was mainly given there was a related but different idea, which I now would call two kinds of syntactic identity in distinction from two ways of identification. In fact, these two ideas were still undifferentiated in "On Formalism," which I think is more of a hindrance than a contribution to the communication of my re-thinking of "mind." I admit that "On Formalism" is a work of a still extremely premature thinker.
I decided to revise this paper. I'm working on it now.
In the meantime, I will write directly on the two ways of identification here, in a series of short informal essays. I will upload this series of essays in one Word file (compatible mode), and will replace it as I add more essays to it.
3/3/2011
Let me clarify the shift from the second-last paragraph to the very last paragraph of the Essay 1 in the uploaded file.
If we accept the fundamental gap claim, then, the kind of simultaneous reference and predication, as we know them, are rendered impossible. (See below, the square bracketed passage, for more on this inference.) Since such reference and predication are impossible, we are now obliged to re-think about what it is that (appear to us as what) we do when we (appear to us to be) referring and predicating (as we know them). An alternative line of thinking almost suggests itself to me. It invites us to think about what it is that "we," discourse-participants together, mutually succeed to achieve (and, indeed, are forced to achieve, insofar as we aspire to "act" rationally) in mutually understanding what we do (referring and predicating) as what"we"(notice that this is a first-person (plural) pronoun) do (notice that this is a generic action verb, as opposed to a success verb). In part, this is a suggestion to re-think of "to refer" and "to predicate," and, in general, all sorts of verbs usually considered action verbs, not as action verbs but as success verbs --- or, to borrow Austin's terminology, not as illocutionary verbs but as perlocutionary verbs. In another part, this is a suggestion to re-think, in social terms, of what we (are forced to) achieve in mutually understanding ourselves as referring and predicating (in the way we do), as putting one another (including oneself) under certain internal and external ontological commitments, concerning both what sort of things "we" are (i.e., what sort of things we should treat one another, as well as oneself, are) and what sorts of things there are "out there" (i.e., what sorts things we should countenance as being "out there," equally "accessible" to all of "us"). Moreover, this is a suggestion to re-think of our achieving these as our defining and re-defining, in practice, "ourselves" and "things out there" in terms of each other.
This line of (partly Brandomian) re-thinking of reference and predication is virtually a rough outline of the kind of re-thinking of "truth" I've been pursuing as a part of my re-thinking of "mind."
[Above, I said: If we accept the fundamental gap claim, then, the kind of simultaneous reference and predication, as we know them, are rendered impossible. Here, I' m making a "leap of reasoning" similar to one we constantly make whenever we reject a hypothesis that turns out to be a self-contradiction, on the ground that there can be no such a thing as a self-contradicting "fact." Such is a "leap" from epistemological illicitness to ontological (or metaphysical) impossibility. That we have to make this sort of "leap," if we are to "act" rationally, is a part of the picture my re-thinking of "mind" tries to draw. But, that is what my "leap" is, too, in the essence. I must admit that in making this "leap" myself, my own re-thinking of "mind" is under the same spell of language, so to speak, as our natural way of thinking about us. Why "we" are allowed, or, indeed, obliged, to make this sort of "leap" from epistemology to ontology does not seem to be something that "we," as the ones who are making the very "leap," can or should explain. If my re-thinking of "mind" is carried out to a certain degree of completion in future, and if I live long enough after that, I might want to reflect upon how exactly my own re-thinking of "mind" was merely yet another repetition of a familiar scene in --- or rather, segment of --- our history. Until then, I have no choice but engage in my re-thinking, and while doing so, I seem to be in no position to say anything about the "leap" I must be making in so doing (here again, the same "leap"!).]
Let me clarify the shift from the second-last paragraph to the very last paragraph of the Essay 1 in the uploaded file.
If we accept the fundamental gap claim, then, the kind of simultaneous reference and predication, as we know them, are rendered impossible. (See below, the square bracketed passage, for more on this inference.) Since such reference and predication are impossible, we are now obliged to re-think about what it is that (appear to us as what) we do when we (appear to us to be) referring and predicating (as we know them). An alternative line of thinking almost suggests itself to me. It invites us to think about what it is that "we," discourse-participants together, mutually succeed to achieve (and, indeed, are forced to achieve, insofar as we aspire to "act" rationally) in mutually understanding what we do (referring and predicating) as what"we"(notice that this is a first-person (plural) pronoun) do (notice that this is a generic action verb, as opposed to a success verb). In part, this is a suggestion to re-think of "to refer" and "to predicate," and, in general, all sorts of verbs usually considered action verbs, not as action verbs but as success verbs --- or, to borrow Austin's terminology, not as illocutionary verbs but as perlocutionary verbs. In another part, this is a suggestion to re-think, in social terms, of what we (are forced to) achieve in mutually understanding ourselves as referring and predicating (in the way we do), as putting one another (including oneself) under certain internal and external ontological commitments, concerning both what sort of things "we" are (i.e., what sort of things we should treat one another, as well as oneself, are) and what sorts of things there are "out there" (i.e., what sorts things we should countenance as being "out there," equally "accessible" to all of "us"). Moreover, this is a suggestion to re-think of our achieving these as our defining and re-defining, in practice, "ourselves" and "things out there" in terms of each other.
This line of (partly Brandomian) re-thinking of reference and predication is virtually a rough outline of the kind of re-thinking of "truth" I've been pursuing as a part of my re-thinking of "mind."
[Above, I said: If we accept the fundamental gap claim, then, the kind of simultaneous reference and predication, as we know them, are rendered impossible. Here, I' m making a "leap of reasoning" similar to one we constantly make whenever we reject a hypothesis that turns out to be a self-contradiction, on the ground that there can be no such a thing as a self-contradicting "fact." Such is a "leap" from epistemological illicitness to ontological (or metaphysical) impossibility. That we have to make this sort of "leap," if we are to "act" rationally, is a part of the picture my re-thinking of "mind" tries to draw. But, that is what my "leap" is, too, in the essence. I must admit that in making this "leap" myself, my own re-thinking of "mind" is under the same spell of language, so to speak, as our natural way of thinking about us. Why "we" are allowed, or, indeed, obliged, to make this sort of "leap" from epistemology to ontology does not seem to be something that "we," as the ones who are making the very "leap," can or should explain. If my re-thinking of "mind" is carried out to a certain degree of completion in future, and if I live long enough after that, I might want to reflect upon how exactly my own re-thinking of "mind" was merely yet another repetition of a familiar scene in --- or rather, segment of --- our history. Until then, I have no choice but engage in my re-thinking, and while doing so, I seem to be in no position to say anything about the "leap" I must be making in so doing (here again, the same "leap"!).]
3/17/2011
By now, I have been revising this series of essays (originally intended as informal essays) many times. Those revisions contain revisions of substantial errors. Keep revising something that has been in some sense "published" may be irresponsible in some sense. I can only apologize. Although these essays are no longer as informal as I first planned (I was thinking of something a lot closer to blog entries --- I'm too uptight, as usual ...), please consider them informal memos that I write to ask for people's opinions --- hopefully encouraging ones, if also containing unsparing criticisms.
This applies to all the texts of this website.
By now, I have been revising this series of essays (originally intended as informal essays) many times. Those revisions contain revisions of substantial errors. Keep revising something that has been in some sense "published" may be irresponsible in some sense. I can only apologize. Although these essays are no longer as informal as I first planned (I was thinking of something a lot closer to blog entries --- I'm too uptight, as usual ...), please consider them informal memos that I write to ask for people's opinions --- hopefully encouraging ones, if also containing unsparing criticisms.
This applies to all the texts of this website.